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lnheri tance Rights of 
Cryogenically-Preserved 
"Preembryos": An Analysis of 
Davis v. Davis1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Science and technology are continually advancing. The 
legal world must keep pace with the evolving scientific 
world in order to adequately address new moral and legal 
issues spawned by the discoveries of science. Legal rights 
are potentially changed, created or destroyed by scientific 
advancements. Often, the impact of changing technology on 
the law is not instantly apparent. The complexities of a new 
discovery are usually exposed slowly through conflicts with 
legal rules established to fit the world before such a discov-
ery. 
A good example of a clash between new technology and 
established law is the 1992 Tennessee case, Davis v. Da-
vis.2 This case involved cryogenics, the new technology of 
freezing fertilized human ova for later implantation.3 The 
Supreme Court of Tennessee, ruling on the legal status of 
the frozen ova, accepted the name "preembryo" for the ova 
and concluded that the ova occupied an interim category 
entitling them to "special respect".4 The legal implications 
of this technology may seem slight on the surface, but be-
low lurks a myriad of new legal issues. Each issue may 
influence longstanding policies and purposes of existing laws 
governing the affected area. 
1. H42 S.W.2d 58H, (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. :-JfiH1 (U.S. Feb. 22, 
199:-J) (No. 92-910). 
2. ld. 
a. The process of cryogenic preservation involves freezing the fertilized ova in 
nitrogen and then storing them at sub-zero temperatures to preserve them for later 
implantation. ld. at 592. 
4. ld. at 597. 
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It is reasonable to assume that the decision in Davis 
was influenced by the current debate over abortion. Either 
the pro-choice argument or the pro-life argument could be 
strengthened by a determination of the Tennessee Supreme 
Court in their favor. In order to avoid favoring one side 
over the other, the court created an intermediate category 
that would not be of great impact to either side of the 
debate. While avoiding the entanglements of the abortion 
issue, the court has created great confusion in many other 
areas of law that may be involved with preembryos. 
This note will examine the decision in Davis and ana-
lyze how the court's disposition of the frozen fertilized eggs 
could impact the current laws of wills and trusts. Section II 
will give a background of the Davis case. Section III will 
examine beneficiary rights, if any, that preembryos may 
have in a trust agreement. Consideration will be given to 
statutory as well as common law decisions. Section IV will 
discuss the rights that frozen fertilized ova may have under 
laws governing testamentary dispositions and intestate suc-
cession. Issues will be raised and possible solutions will be 
examined in both areas. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE DAVIS CASE 
Mary Sue and Junior Lewis Davis were married in 
April of 1980.5 After several unsuccessful attempts at hav-
ing children, Mary Sue underwent surgery, related to her 
reproductive problems, that left her incapable of conceiving 
a child naturally.6 As an alternative, the Davises decided to 
try "in vitro fertilization" ("IVF"f Because the IVF process 
was very painful for Mary Sue, the couple decided to insem-
inate several ova and have them cryogenically preserved for 
later attempts at implantation. Mter an unsuccessful im-
plantation attempt the Davises were left with seven unused 
frozen embryos. 8 
5. ld. at 591. 
6. ld. 
7. In vitro fertilization "involves the aspiration of ova from the follicles of a 
woman's ovaries, fertilization of these ova in a petri dish using the sperm provided 
by a man, and the transfer of the product of this procedure into the uterus of the 
woman from whom the ova were taken." ld. 
8. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *3 (Tenn. Cir. Sept. 21, 
1989). 
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In February of 1989, Junior Davis filed for divorce. 8 
The only complication in the divorce proceedings was deter-
mining how to dispose of the seven frozen embryos. 10 Un-
fortunately, the Davises failed to execute a written agree-
ment dictating how to dispose of any unused embryos. 11 
The trial court reviewed the testimonies of several scientists 
and doctors knowledgeable in the IVF field. Mter hearing 
evidence regarding the distinction made in the medical field 
between embryos and preembryos, the trial court refused to 
recognize the term "preembryo", claiming that the word 
created a "false distinction" between the two terms. 12 Ins-
tead, the trial court concluded that the frozen embryos were 
"human beings" and not property. 13 Accordingly, Mary Sue 
was given custody of the embryos so she could bring the 
"children" to term through implantation. 14 
Junior Davis then appealed the trial court's decision, 
and the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the decision 
regarding the proper disposition of the preembryos. 15 The 
court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court with 
orders "to enter a judgement vesting Mary Sue and Junior 
with joint control of the fertilized ova and with equal voice 
over their disposition."16 
The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review of the 
case "because of the obvious importance of the case in terms 
of the development of law regarding the new reproductive 
technologies."17 The Supreme Court of Tennessee stated 
that the conclusion by the Court of Appeals left the impres-
sion that the rights which Junior and Mary Sue had in the 
frozen ova were, "in the nature of a property interest."18 
The court also overruled the decision of the trial court and 
9. Davis v. Davis, R42 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tenn. 1992). 
10. ld. 
11. ld. at fi90. 
12. In rejecting the use of the term the trial court quipped "What's in a name? 
that which we call a rose By another name would smell as sweet." Davis v. Davis, 
No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *7 (Tenn. Cir. Sept. 21, 1989) (quoting Romeo 
and Juliet (Act II, Scene II)). 
18. ld. at *9. 
14. ld. at *11. 
15. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 180807 (Tenn. App. Sept. 18, 1990); 59 
U.S.L.W. 2205. 
16. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 at *3. 
17. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992). 
18. ld. at fi96. 
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accepted the scientific term "preembryo" to describe the 
frozen fertilized ova. 19 
The positions of both Junior and Mary Sue have shifted 
since the original divorce proceeding. Both have remarried 
and Mary Sue wishes to donate the preembryos to a child-
less couple rather than use them herself. 20 Junior Davis is 
opposed to any such donation and would rather have the 
preembryos discarded.21 The Tennessee Supreme Court was 
called upon to decide whether the preembryos should prop-
erly be considered persons in the custody of Mary Sue, as 
the trial court held, or property held in joint control of both 
Junior and Mary Sue, as the court of appeals held.22 
The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed with the court of 
appeals that the preembryos could not be considered "per-
sons" under either Tennessee or federal law.23 However, 
the court did not agree with the treatment given the pre-
embryos by the court of appeals. The high court concluded 
that the preembryos were neither persons nor property, but 
rather occupied "an interim category of special respect be-
cause of their potential for human life."24 
The decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in the 
Davis case creates a new category of "matter" that lies 
between a living person and inanimate property. The cre-
ation of this new category could alter various areas of the 
law that are somehow connected to, or involved with pre-
embryos, the only known member of this category requiring 
"special respect." The remainder of this note will discuss the 
possible effects this may have in the areas of wills and 
trust law. 
19. The term encompasses the time from when the ovum is fertilized to about 
fourteen days, at which time the cells begin to differentiate into separate distin-
guishable body parts. !d. at 593. 
20. Davis v. Davis, R42 S.W .2d 58R, 590 (Tenn. 1992). 
21. !d. 
22. !d. at fi94. 
23. !d. at 595. 
24. !d. at 597. 
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III. THE EFFECT OF SPECIAL RESPECT FOR 
PREEMBRYOS ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
355 
The status given preembryos by the Tennessee Supreme 
Court creates a category not yet treated in the law of 
trusts. Many questions will arise as to if, or when, pre-
embryos become involved in trust transactions. Although the 
Davis decision is not binding outside of Tennessee, it will 
most likely be persuasive authority in later preembryo liti-
gation because of the case's ground-breaking nature. For 
discussion purposes, the fact situation in Davis will be used 
as a model for discussing the problems presented in this 
note. 
A. Preembryos as Trust Beneficiaries 
In order to create a valid trust agreement, there must 
be "a beneficiary who is definitely ascertained at the time of 
the creation of the trust, or definitely ascertainable within 
the rule against perpetuities."25 Under the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, an unborn child will be allowed as a 
beneficiary so long as "the interest is to vest in the child 
within the period of the rule against perpetuities.'>26 
1. Ascertainability of preembryos: Requirement of 
definiteness 
The Davis decision gave no indication of whether a 
preembryo would be considered "definitely ascertainable" as 
a beneficiary, as required by trust law. In Morsman v. Com-
missioner,27 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit stated that the legal and equitable title of 
trust property is not separated when the sole beneficiary, or 
group of beneficiaries, is non-existent, therefore, a valid 
present trust cannot be created. However, an immediate 
resulting trust will be created "with an express trust for 
25. F.P.P. Enters. v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 713, 717 (D. Neb. 1986). See 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRU&'l'S § 112 (1959). Section 112 is entitled "Defi-
nite Beneficiary Necessary" and states, "A trust is not created unless there is a 
beneficiary who is defmitely ascertained at the time of the creation of the trust or 
definitely ascertainable within the period of the rule against perpetuities." 
26. RESI'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRU&'l'S § 112 cmt. d (1959). 
27. 90 F.2d 18 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 701 (1937). 
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the child springing up when and if such child ever material-
izes."28 
While a beneficiary must be clearly identified, this need 
not be done by name.29 Morsman concerned a trust in 
which the testator named his issue as beneficiaries. At the 
time of the trust the testator had no issue.30 It has been 
held that, "the term 'issue,' unless otherwise limited or 
qualified, embraces all lineal descendants of the settlor."31 
More succinctly stated, "issue" includes all biological descen-
dants unless there are "clear expressions of a contrary in-
tent."32 Under these definitions, all preembryos will be the 
issue of their gamete donors. Since there is no requirement 
that the child be born, the preembryo will retain this status 
through out preservation. 
How do preembryos fit into the reasoning of Morsman? 
The court stated, "[ w ]here the beneficiary is in being, the 
beneficial interest may be vested in him though its enjoy-
ment be postponed."33 Does the interim category they have 
been assigned in Davis give them the status of "in being''? 
Morsman further held that a suit could be maintained for a 
beneficiary who has been "born or conceived."34 Under this 
reasoning, a preembryo, having passed the point of concep-
tion, would have rights as a beneficiary. This conclusion 
could be contested on the basis that when Morsman was de-
cided in 1937, the court did not contemplate such a situa-
tion. Therefore, Morsman is not likely to be applied to cases 
involving preembryos. 
2. Determination of the rule against perpetuities 
The rule against perpetuities has been defined as "a 
positive mandate of law, to be obeyed irrespective of the 
question of intention; and, apart from resort to lives in 
being (plus the possible period of gestation) as the standard 
for measuring the period of time for postponement of the 
28. !d. at 24 (quoting BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 163). 
29. First Nat'! Bank in Ord v. Schroeder, 383 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Neb. 1986) 
(quoting 76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts § 13fi at 377 (197fi)). 
30. Morsman, 90 F.2d at 23. 
31. Bonney v. Granger, 356 S.E.2d 13R, 142 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (citations 
omitted). 
32. Powers v. Wilkenson, fi06 N.E.2d 842, 848 (Mass. 1987). 
33. Morsman, 90 F.2d at 2fi. 
34. !d. (emphasis supplied). 
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vesting of a future estate."35 The rule is sometimes very 
confusing, but Melcher also gives a "universally accepted 
short definition" that is suitable for most purposes in this 
note. 36 The shortened rule states, "[n]o interest is good 
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one 
years after some life in being at the creation of the inter-
est."37 
There is a difficult paradox when the rule is applied in 
situations that involve preembryos. The scientific evidence 
offered in Davis stated that the preembryos could be pre-
served for a period of two years. 38 However, if cryogenic 
technology improves to the point where preembryos can be 
preserved indefinitely,39 some important questions will need 
to be answered. For example, should a preembryo be consid-
ered a "life in being?" Added weight is given to answering 
in the affirmative when the gestation period noted in the 
rule's more expansive definition given in Melcher is consid-
ered.40 
If preembryos with an indefinite life are considered lives 
in being, then it is conceivable that an interest may never 
vest, but always have the possibility of vesting. Accordingly, 
the rule could not be used to invalidate a trust in this 
situation. Furthermore, preembryos could be used to circum-
vent the Rule Against Perpetuities by allowing trust proper-
ty to be held perpetually without violating the rule. This 
outcome is in direct conflict with the purpose of the rule, 
namely, to prevent perpetual control by the dead, and allow 
the living to put such property to good use.41 
35. Melcher v. Camp, 435 P.2d 107, 108 (Okla. 1967) (emphasis supplied). 
36. ld. at 111. 
37. [d. (quoting GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, at 191 (4th ed. 1942)). 
38. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590. 
39. This situation is reasonably imaginable. The treatment of the preembryos in 
the present case alone demonstrates that the two year limit has already been sur-
passed. The Davis preembryos were frozen on December 10, 1988. See Davis v. 
Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 14049fi, at *:{ (Tenn. Cir. Sept. 21, 1989). The case 
was denied certiorari by the United States Supreme Court in February 1993, 
where implantation was still considered a possibility. Davis v. Davis, 113 S. Ct. 
1042 (1993). This demonstrates the medical clinic's belief that the preembryos were 
still viable even after being frozen for over four years. Furthermore, the Tennessee 
Supreme court noted that between the time the case was first instituted, and the 
time the case reached the state supreme court, technology had improved to the 
point where preembryos could be preserved for ten years. Davis, at 842 n.22. 
40. 435 P.2d at 108. 
41. JESSE DUKEMINIER, Wills. Trusts and Estates, 761 (4th ed. 1990). 
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To preserve the rule, a special standard must be set for 
dealing with preembryos. It would be necessary to examine 
the intent of the settlor concerning the preembryos. This 
would create a flexible rule, in contrast to the statement in 
Melcher calling the rule, "a positive mandate of law, to be 
obeyed irrespective of the question of intention."42 Further-
more, holding the trust invalid through enforcement of the 
Rule Against Perpetuities could divest a preembryo of the 
"postponed" enjoyment43 of the resulting trust discussed in 
Morsman. 44 The resulting trust could spring into an ex-
press trust if a preembryo ever came to term.45 There may 
not be a satisfactory answer at this time, but perhaps fu-
ture technology will help provide us with a suitable rule -
hopefully less complicated than the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities - to deal with this problem. 
B. Protection of Preembryo Trust Interests 
As discussed above, under the letter of present laws, 
preembryos can take an interest in trust as beneficiaries. 
These rightful interests need to be protected should anyone 
try to sever them. Even an irrevocable trust can be modi-
fied or revoked with the consent of the settlor and all the 
beneficiaries.46 If a preembryo is determined a valid benefi-
ciary of a trust, the interest it possesses needs to be pro-
tected. Obviously, the preembryo is unable to seek protection 
on its own. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for 
the protection of infants and incompetents through the use 
of a guardian ad litem.47 Under the rules, discretion is left 
to the courts to determine whether a guardian ad litem 
should be appointed.48 
In Morsman, the court discussed the practice of appoint-
ing a guardian stating, "[i]t is true that a guardian may be 
appointed for an unborn child which is in esse."49 However 
the court reasoned, "it is difficult to understand how such 
an appointment can be made for a child not yet conceived 
42. Melcher, 4::15 P.2d at 108. 
43. Morsman, 90 F.2d at 21i. 
44. !d. at 24. 
41i. !d. 
46. Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 284 F. Supp. 396, 396-97 (D.D.C. 1968). 
47. FED. R. C!V. P. 17(c). 
48. !d. 
49. Morsman, 90 F.2d at 21i (citations omitted). 
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where there is no other basis of jurisdiction."50 Theoretical-
ly, the court in Morsman may simply have found that since 
the preembryos were already conceived, they could have a 
guardian appointed to them. The court concluded, however, 
that a present interest was needed for a guardian to be 
appointed. 51 Under the ruling in Morsman, the preembryos 
are not allowed a guardian ad litem because unborn benefi-
ciaries do not have a present interest.52 The reasoning 
and decision of Morsman was later contradicted by the deci-
sion in Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank,53 which stated that 
modification or revocation of even an irrevocable trust can 
be carried out with the consent of the settlor and all of the 
beneficiaries. Although it did not expressly overturn 
Morsman, the court held that the rights of the unborn could 
be protected by a guardian ad litem appointed by the 
court.54 The Hatch court noted that the power to appoint a 
guardian was granted in rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The court reasoned that the purpose of the 
rule is to protect the interests of infants and incompe-
tents.55 Using the policy reasons behind rule 17(c), the 
court concluded that, "[t]he same considerations which allow 
appointment of a guardian ad litem for minors or incom-
petents apply with respect to an unborn person."56 
The interim position given to preembryos strengthens 
their legally protected position in the law. They are more 
than merely unborn beneficiaries, and in some respects they 
could be considered "in being", since they are actually in 
existence. They have also passed the threshold test of con-
ception. 57 For these purposes, preembryos should be given 
some type of protection when their interests are threatened. 
IV. THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF 
PREEMBRYOS ON THE LAW OF WILLS 
Preembryos will probably cause future reform in the law 
of wills. Consideration of testamentary trusts is sufficiently 
50. !d. 
51. !d. 
52. !d. at 25-26. 
53. 284 F. Supp. 396 m.D.C. 1968). 
54. !d. at 399. 
55. !d. 
56. !d. 
57. See. e.,;., Morsman, 90 F.2d at 25. 
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covered in the discussion above. The primary problem under 
testamentary law will be the level of specificity used in 
testamentary documents. As discussed below, much of the 
accustomed language used in preparing a testamentary docu-
ment will take on new and expanded meaning. 
A. Use of the terms ((heirs" and ((issue" 
It is common for the term "heirs" to be used in testa-
mentary documents. The term has been held to mean "those 
who would, under the statute of distribution, be entitled to 
the personal estate" of the testator.58 This definition will 
not cause a problem if preembryos are only used by the 
gamete donors. They will rightfully take a position as heirs 
when the donor/testator dies. However, if the preembryos 
are donated, as was attempted in Davis,59 are they the 
heirs of the gamete donors, or of the individuals, to whom 
they are donated? Does it make a difference if the pre-
embryos are sold instead of donated? 
Similar questions are raised concerning a testator's "is-
sue." This term is also used in many testamentary docu-
ments. As discussed above, issue includes all "biological 
descendants" unless a contrary intent is clearly stated.60 In 
a testamentary document "'issue' or 'lawful issue' . . . are 
to be construed as words of limitation to the inheritance 
equivalent to the technical expression 'heirs of the body."'61 
Under these definitions, it appears that preembryos are 
issue only of the gamete donors, regardless of donation. 
Allowing testamentary rights to frozen embryos could 
pose an unwanted financial burden on a gamete donor who 
is against donation or implantation. Junior Davis was op-
posed to donation of the Davis preembryos. The court stated 
that donation resulting in gestation and birth of the pre-
embryos would impose "possible financial and psychological 
consequences,"62 but did not state what these financial bur-
dens might entail. It is possible that the court was referring 
fiR. Cotton v. Cotton, 61 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tenn. 1933). 
59. Davit<, H42 S.W.2d at 590 (Tenn. 1992). 
60. See t<upra note 84 and accompanying text (citing Powers v. Wilkenson, fi06 
N.E.2d H42, H4H (Mass. 19H7)). 
61. Riggs Nat'! Bank v. Summerlin, 445 F.2d 201, 204 (D.C. Cir.) (citations 
omitted), cert. denied, 404 U.S. Hfil (1971). 
62. Davit<, R42 S.W.2d at 604. 
--------------------------
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to some sort of support obligation. It is also feasible that 
these financial responsibilities could come from the possibili-
ty of future inheritance rights for the preembryos. 
There may be protection against the use of "issue" in a 
testamentary document. It has been held that the court can 
examine the will itself to give the word the meaning intend-
ed by the testator.63 This requires a person to employ clar-
ity in drafting his or her will. 
Some of the problems pertaining to preembryos can be 
eliminated by using specific language in the disposition of 
property in one's will. Failure to treat "heirs" and "issue" 
with specificity could lead to unpleasant and unforeseen re-
sults in cases involving preembryos. 
B. Adoption of Preembryos 
Another possible solution is to let the adoption laws 
govern the donation or transfer of preembryos. "The effect of 
adoption is to terminate the rights of the natural par-
ents."64 If governed by adoption laws, the rights of a pre-
embryo with respect to the natural parents will also be 
terminated. 65 If one of the gamete donors adopts the 
preembryo with a different spouse, however, adoption by the 
new spouse would not sever the right to inherit from the 
ex-spouse gamete donor.66 
Equitable adoption is another possible method of govern-
ing the transfer of preembryos. The doctrine of equitable 
adoption recognizes an adoption in equity even when no for-
mal adoption has occurred. As an equity doctrine, it can be 
applied as justice requires.67 Equitable remedies of this 
type may prove very useful in structuring laws to deal with 
preembryos, despite the fact that only the adoptee can en-
force an equitable adoption. 68 As discussed above, a guard-
ian ad litem may enforce this action if the preembryo has 
not yet gone to term, or is still in its infancy.69 
68. Summerlin, 44fi F.2d at 20fi. 
64. L.F.M. v. Department of Social Servs., 507 A.2d 1151, 1160 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1986). 
6fi. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b) (1990). 
66. !d. §§ 2-114(b)(i) & (ii). 
67. See. e.g., Burdick v. Grimshaw, 168 A. 186, 188 (N.J. Ch. 1988). 
6R In re Estate of Riggs, 440 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1981). 
69. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text at page 11; See also Peoples 
Nat'! Bank v. Barlow, 112 S.E.2d 896, 899 (S.C. 1960) (assigning a guardian ad 
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C. Pretermittant Statutes 
If adoption of preembryos is not allowed, most states 
have statutes to protect pretermitted children. Pretermittant 
statutes generally allow a child who is inadvertently left out 
of a will, including those unborn at the time the will is exe-
cuted, to take a share equivalent to what he or she would 
take under intestate succession. 70 Thus, preembryos could 
receive protection under these statutes as an unborn child. 
The purpose of these statutes has been stated as, "to 
guard against the unintentional omission of the decedent's 
natural heirs from a share in the estate due to oversight, 
accident, mistake or an unexpected change of condition."71 
The equivalent federal statute also includes children born 
after execution of the will. 72 It has been stated that an af-
ter-born child needs to be "'in esse,'- at least conceived" 
prior to the death of a testator. 73 
It has been held that a child born after the death of a 
male intestate is presumed "in esse" from the time of con-
ception, and capable of taking his or her share of the es-
tate. 74 This presumption is only valid for 280 days, or ten 
lunar months after the testator's death. 75 The 280 day lim-
it is used because it is considered the necessary term for 
pregnancy. 76 This time limit presumption is not valid when 
preembryos are concerned. 77 As stated above, a preembryo 
can be conceived and not brought to term for several years. 
Consequentially, this time presumption would preclude 
preembryos from recovering their rightful share of the es-
tate. Fortunately, the court in Byerly made the presumption 
litem in a will dispute). 
70. See, e.g, In re Estate of Jones, 759 P.2d 845, 348-49 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-302(1)(19711)). 
71. Smith v. Crook, 206 Cal. Rptr. 524, fi25-26 (Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (citations 
omitted). 
72. UNIFORM PRORATE CODE § 2-302(a) (1990). Subsection (a) states, "if a tes-
tator fails to provide in his [or her] will for any of his [or her] children born or 
adopted after the execution of the will, the omitted after-born or after-adopted 
child receives a share in the estate." 
7:-l. Vogel v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, fill S.W.2d 784, 789 (Mo. 1974). 
74. Byerly v. Tolbert, lOR S.E.2d 29, 3fi (N.C. 19fi9) (quoting 16 Am.Jur., De-
scent and Distribution § RO, pp. R51-fi2). 
7fi. !d. 
76. Irl. 
77. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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rebuttable if there is "evidence tending to show that intes-
tate was in fact the father of the child. 78 New technolo-
gy,79 as well as good record keeping, will make the pre-
sumption easily rebuttable in preembryo cases. 
It would not be a breach of logic to allow preembryos to 
inherit under pretermittant statutes, since the statutes are 
designed to protect those unable to protect themselves. The 
special respect status given them in Davis could logically 
include protection of inheritance rights. In order to alienate 
a preembryo from its interest, a testator must expressly 
disinherit them.8° Failure to do so could cause great uncer-
tainty in the disposition of the estate. It may be necessary 
to wait until all of the preembryos have been implanted or 
destroyed before the estate can properly be distributed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As science progresses, so must the law. Not only are 
new twists put on present law, but advancing technology 
creates the need for whole new areas of law. Many new 
domains created by modern technology will undergo experi-
mentation by legislators and policy makers to determine 
how they could best be governed. 
In Davis v. Davis,81 a new intermediate category was 
established between property and person. The decision 
helped the Tennessee Supreme Court avoid conflict with the 
current abortion issue. While avoiding the abortion issue, 
this decision will undoubtedly cause confusion and uncer-
tainty in other areas of law that deal with preembryos. 
Instead of trying to fit the new category into the existing 
codes, laws need to be created to deal specifically with the 
new category. Until these laws are determined, however, 
there will be great uncertainty in the legal ramifications of 
preembryo rights. For example, what impact will Davis have 
on the abortion issue? And, if someone breaks in and steals 
preembryos, is it larceny or kidnapping? Should a new 
crime be developed for this situation? These questions are 
78. Tolbert, 108 S.E.2d at 35. 
79. For example, the technology of DNA mapping can be used to assist in de-
termining paternal relationships. 
80. Smith, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 526. 
81. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
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beyond the scope of this note, but may well arise at a later 
time. 
For the present time, many problems could be avoided 
in testamentary and trust cases involving preembryos by re-
quiring disposition contracts to be drawn up when a couple 
initiates in vitro fertilization. Using specificity when pre-
embryos are involved will also help avoid complications until 
adequate laws can be devised to govern this new territory. 
This note has examined how one technological advance-
ment has affected small portions of only two areas of the 
law. It has merely scratched the surface of the potential im-
pact that this decision may have. Although not binding out-
side of Tennessee, because of its ground-breaking nature the 
Davis decision is certain to be influential in other jurisdic-
tions that deal with these issues. The Tennessee Supreme 
Court should have considered the broad impact of their deci-
sion more closely, rather than being concerned with the 
possible impact of the case on the single issue of abortion. 
Steve Murphy 
